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THE RHETORIC OF TRADE AND THE PRAGMATISM OF POLICY: CANADIAN 
AND NEW ZEALAND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, 1920-1950 
 
Francine McKenzie 
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The University of Western Ontario 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In April 1948 Prime Minister Mackenzie King pulled Canada out of secret free 
trade negotiations with the United States.  Although many officials in the Department of 
External Affairs believed that a continental free trade agreement was in Canada’s best 
interests, King confided to his diary that he could not let the negotiations go forward 
because a successful outcome would destroy the British Empire and Commonwealth: ‘I 
am sure in so doing, I have made one of the most important decisions for Canada, for the 
British Commonwealth of Nations that has been made at any time.’1   In October 1949, 
while being fêted in London, Prime Minister Sydney Holland of New Zealand, made one 
of his characteristic spontaneous and ill considered statements.  He declared, ‘I want the 
people of Britain to know that we will send all the food that they need, even if we have to 
send it free’.2  These two stories tell historians a lot.  The first striking thing is how 
emotion, self-importance and flattery can go to the heads of prime ministers, sometimes 
in ways that make a meaningful impress upon external policy and foreign relations.  
These anecdotes can also be unpacked to reveal more important historical insights.  First, 
the connection to Britain was obviously a subject that inspired powerful emotional 
responses in leaders from Canada and New Zealand after the Second World War, and 
presumably also reflected the attachment of many of their citizens to Britain.  Second, 
Canadian and New Zealand politicians understood trade to be a meaningful connection to 
Britain, both as an expression and pillar of their relationship.  The third insight stems 
from these two observations and has methodological implications: trade policies and 
                                                 
1 King diary, 21 April 1948; available on-line at http://king.collectionscanada.ca/EN/default.asp.  M. Hart, 
‘Almost But Not Quite: the 1947-1948 Bilateral Canada-U.S. Negotiations’, American Review of Canadian 
Studies, 19, 1 (Spring 1989), 25-58. 
2 Bruce Brown, ‘From Bulk Purchase to Butter Disputes: New Zealand’s Special Trading Relations with 
Britain’, in Robert G. Patman, ed., New Zealand & Britain: A Special Relationship in Transition 
(Palmerston North, 1997), p. 43. 
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patterns can be read to gain insight into relations between states.  For example, trade 
patterns and policies were measures of the warmth or chilliness of a relationship and 
could also be used to change that temperature.  Trade links were also a subliminal and 
powerful form of international contact.  What people consumed both shaped and affirmed 
individual values, tastes, and preferences which in turn informed national identity and 
influenced international connections.3  Moreover, trade policy revealed the relationship 
that governments aspired to, even if they were not always realized.  Commercial 
connections and the policies that sustained them can help historians to better understand 
the motivations behind and the nature of diplomatic alignments. 
Trade is an especially promising source for relations between Britain and its 
former colonies.  Twentieth century British politicians certainly believed that trade ties 
were essential to political goals, especially the preservation of the British Empire.  After 
the First World War British politicians formulated trade policy in a strategic way, to 
counteract constitutional developments, such as the Statute of Westminster, and the 
growing independence of the ‘old dominions’, in order to sustain British influence, even 
if it existed in an informal condition.4  Britain was displaced by the United States as the 
centre of a global economy after the First World War5 and devastated financially by the 
                                                 
3 There are, for example, many works which examine the spread of American commercial influence, 
although they are not simply accounts of cultural capitulation but also of resistance, adaptation and 
appropriation.  Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth Century 
Europe (Cambridge MA, 2005).  Reinhold Wagnleiter, Coco-colonization and the Cold War: the cultural 
mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill and London, 1994).  Jeff 
R. Schutts, ‘Born again in the Gospel of Refreshment: Coco-colonization and the Re-making of Postwar 
German Identity’, in David F. Crew, ed., Consuming Germany in the Cold War (Oxford and New York, 
2003), pp. 121-150. 
4 Darwin has argued that granting constitutional rights and equality was a way to nip dominions’ 
nationalism in the bud.  J. Darwin, ‘Imperialism in decline?: Tendencies in British Imperial Policy Between 
the Wars’, The Historical Journal 23, 3 (1980), 657-679.  Philip Williamson made the case that 
perpetuating imperial economic unity was ‘a central issue in the preservation of the self-governing Empire 
following the 1926 Balfour Report’  P. Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British 
Politics, the Economy and Empire, 1926-1932 (Cambridge 1992), 80.  T. Rooth, British Protectionism and 
the International Economy: Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 10, 318; I. 
M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection (London 
1974), 422; J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review, 
second series, Vol. VI, no. I, (1953), 4. 
5 Historians agree that the imperial economy fragmented between 1919 and 1939 although they identify 
different dates in the 1930s and 1930s to mark this change.  W. K. Hancock, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs Vol. II: Problems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939 (London, rpt 1964), p. 291.  R. F. 
Holland identifies the mid to late 1930s as the time when dominions and Britain opted for the international 
economy.  See ‘The End of an Imperial Economy: Anglo-Canadian Disengagement in the 1930s’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (1983), 2, 159-174.  N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth 
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second, contributing to the country’s relative and relentless economic and political 
decline.  Maintaining an imperial economy with Britain at its centre might stave off, even 
reverse, this decline.  As J. E. Coulson of the Foreign Office explained in 1945, ‘our 
position as the center of the British Commonwealth will, if we can maintain harmonious 
economic relations with the Dominions, go far to provide us with the power which we 
require for the backing of our foreign policy.’6   
 Nationalist historical narratives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa intersect with narratives of British decline, even if they are sometimes told as 
though they were entirely separate.7  Nationalist accounts trace an inexorable progression 
from colony to nation8 and generally regard the period between the First and Second 
World Wars as crucial to their nationalist awakening, signaled in part by their emergence 
as individual and independent actors in world affairs.9  The timing and pace of the 
Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African experiences of decolonization 
differed, but the broad outline and pattern were the same.  Such accounts generally focus 
on political and constitutional developments, but there is a parallel economic story.  In 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the settler colonies experienced tremendous 
economic growth within an imperial-international economy: they were specialized; their 
development was export-driven; and they were semi-industrialized by the start of the 
First World War.10  After 1918 the dominions realized the limits of imperial trade – 
particularly the British market – and they became increasingly engaged in international 
                                                                                                                                                 
Experience (London, 1969), pp. 245-6.  Rooth, British Protectionism, p. 34.  I. M. Drummond, British 
Economic Policy and the Empire 1919-1939 (London, 1972), p. 114. 
6 J. E. Coulson, ‘The Effect of our External Financial Position on our Foreign Policy’, 30 March 1945, NA: 
FO371/62420. 
7 A. Hopkins ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’, Past and Present, no. 164, 
(Aug. 1999), 202-3. 
8 There are many studies of nationalism in the colonies of settlement, many of which trace the beginnings 
of the process to the late 19th century.  See J. Eddy and D. Schreuder, eds, The Rise of Colonial 
Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert Their Nationalities 1880-1914 
(Sydney, 1988), C. Berger, Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism (Toronto, 1970), 
K. Sinclair, A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity (Wellington 1986), W. J. Hudson 
and M. P. Sharp, Australian Independence: From Colony to Reluctant Nation (Carlton, Vic., 1988). 
9 As Philippa Mein Smith put it recently, ‘The 1930s and 1940s was a formative era in nation-building 
through the conscious ‘making’ of New Zealand.’  A Concise History of New Zealand (Cambridge, 2005), 
p. 150.  F. McKenzie, ‘Coming of Age: Independence and Foreign Policy in Canada and Australia, 1931-
1945’, in M. MacMillan and F. McKenzie, eds, Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the 
Twentieth Century (Vancouver, 2003), pp. 34-61.   
10 D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere 
(Oxford, 1983), pp. 14-15, 212. 
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and regional economic activity and took action in an independent vein, such as 
establishing independent central banks.11  The underlying assumption that political and 
economic approaches were parallel meant that rudimentary economic development and 
on-going commercial attachment to Britain was evidence of persistent colonial 
subordination whereas economic diversification and commercial detachment confirmed 
their decolonization and arrival as fully fledged states.   
  Recently several historians have challenged nationalist historical interpretations.  
Tony Hopkins maintained that the ties between Canada, New Zealand and Australia 
remained strong, vital and varied well into the 1950s, ‘long after responsible government 
and dominion status had been conferred.’12  This interpretation has a specific economic 
version.  John Singleton and Paul Robertson have argued that a discrete imperial 
economy persisted up to the 1960s.13   James Belich has pushed the argument even 
farther, claiming that Britain effectively recolonized New Zealand economically after the 
Second World War.14  Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw have demonstrated commercial 
and financial interdependence between Britain and South Africa long after a Nationalist 
government, ‘for whom there was no higher ambition than to free their country from 
subordination to Britain’, was elected in 1948.15  These argument, as well as passionate 
                                                 
11 G. R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand (Cambridge, 1985); J. D. Gould, The Rake’s Progress: the 
New Zealand Economy Since 1945 (Auckland, 1982); J.L. Granatstein, How Britain’s weakness forced 
Canada into the arms of the United States  (Toronto, 1989); M. Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade 
Policy from Colonialism to Globalization (Vancouver, 2002).  Hart’s interpretation is not primarily 
concerned with the link between economic developments and political evolution.  His argument is that 
when Canadian trade policy became more rational and professional, and moved towards closer trade 
relations with the US, it became more mature (p. 124).  The underlying logic is not wholly different from 
those who advance nationalist political interpretations. 
12 Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future’, 220. 
13 J. Singleton and P. Robertson, Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia 1945-1970 
(Basingstoke, 2002).  As Singleton explained it, other economic historians have overlooked the persistent 
economic ties between New Zealand and Britain so that they can ‘focus on the areas of commercial 
endeavour in which New Zealand was independent.’  ‘New Zealand, Britain and the Survival of the Ottawa 
Agreements, 1945-1977’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 43 2, (1997), 177. 
14 J. Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 
(Honololu, 2001). 
15 P. Henshaw, ‘Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area: Gold Production, Capital Investment and 
Agricultural Markets, 1931-1961’, The Historical Journal, 39, 1 (1996), 197-223.  R. Hyam and P. 
Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok (Cambridge, 2003), chapter 6.  As they put it, South Africa’s 
membership in the sterling area ‘signified a commitment to sustain a world-wide monetary and trading 
system that was the economic counterpart to and underpinning of the British empire and Commonwealth.’ 
p. 118.  Tim Rooth, ‘Britain, South African Gold, and the Sterling Area, 1945-50’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, vol. 32, no. 1 (2004), 93-114. 
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declarations of attachment to Britain like those made by King and Holland, cast doubt on 
nationalist political narratives.   
 This paper attempts to reconcile these contradictory historiographical trends.  It 
focuses on trade relations between Canada, New Zealand and Britain from 1920-1950, 
beginning with a brief analysis of trade patterns between New Zealand and Canada with 
Britain.  It then explains Canadian and New Zealand trade policies to better understand 
government interests, priorities and objectives.   Canada and New Zealand are fruitful 
comparators because of their similarities and differences.  They were both former 
colonies of settlement of the British Empire.  Early economic activity concentrated on 
resource extraction and their economies developed within an imperial-international 
context.  Although both were physically distant from the mother country, they rallied to 
Britain’s side in the Anglo-Afrikaner war as well as the two world wars.  Both had large 
neighbours (Australia and the United States) to whom there were well developed family, 
cultural, economic and political ties as well as complex feelings of attraction and 
repulsion.  They were also alike in being small states in the international community.  
There were important differences too.  Histories and patterns of settlement meant that 
New Zealand was colonized by Britons whereas Canada’s French and English 
communities developed different conceptions of the new nation, such that the tie to 
Britain was a source of chronic political tension.  In addition, Canada and New Zealand 
seemed to be at opposite ends of the spectrum when it came to willingness to submit to 
British direction in international affairs as well as on questions of constitutional 
clarification and evolution of relations between Britain and the dominions.  Their 
differences make an interpretation potentially more far-reaching because Canada and 
New Zealand constitute two kinds of examples. 
 
TRADE PATTERNS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND BRITAIN, 1920-
1950 
 Canadian and New Zealand trade patterns from 1920-1950 break up into three 
sections, corresponding roughly to each decade.  From 1920, when trade patterns reverted 
to “normal” circumstances after the First World War, to 1929 (the eve of the Depression) 
Canada’s principal exports were overwhelmingly primary in character and a handful of 
items accounted for a large proportion of overall exports.  There was some 
6 
diversification.  For example, American branch plants in Canada exported manufactured 
goods.  But such diversification did not last.16  Canada remained primarily an exporter of 
food products and natural resources and had two principal markets: Britain and the 
United States.  New Zealand exports were overwhelmingly headed for the British market 
and despite slight annual variation, at the close of the decade its position was virtually the 
same as in 1920.  19th century commercial links between New Zealand and Australia had 
largely fallen away.  From 1920 to 1950, New Zealand exports to Australia dropped from 
roughly 5% to 2.5%, in large part because they were natural competitors in this field.  
Both produced agricultural products for export.  Because of a global trend towards 
agricultural protection there were few markets other than Britain that were accessible to 
New Zealand’s agricultural products.   In part because of this, New Zealand developed as 
a farm for the industrial imperial metropole.17  Technological advance, such as 
refrigeration in the 1880s, sustained this economic relationship.  The first trip made by 
The Dunedin in 1882 carrying mutton and butter to London is legendary in New Zealand 
history.18   
 The period from the Depression until the eve of the Second World War witnessed 
economic upheaval and international tension.  Canadians and New Zealanders felt the 
effects of international economic collapse.  Both countries appreciated the value of an 
imperial solution to their economic problems in the form of the Ottawa Imperial 
Economic Conference of 1932 which reinforced intra-imperial trade in an attempt to 
offset rising protection all over the world.  Following the conference Britain regained the 
top spot as a market for Canadian exports, a position it held until 1939.  As for New 
Zealand, exports to Britain dropped by almost 15 percentage points over the course of the 
decade.  Even so, Britain remained overwhelmingly the most important destination.   
 The years of the Second World War and the initial period of postwar recovery, 
roughly the 1940s, witnessed global devastation and preliminary reconstruction.  The war 
had almost no visible effect on the destination of New Zealand’s exports.  Despite the 
                                                 
16 Hart, A Trading Nation, pp. 95-97. 
17 This is a standard description of the New Zealand economy.  For example, W. J. Gardner claimed that 
New Zealand’s prosperity in the late 19th century was bound up in ‘expansion as John Bull’s remote farm.’  
‘A Colonial Economy’ in Geoffrey Rice, ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd edition (Auckland 
and New York, 1992).  Author interview with James Meade, 1993.   
18 Belich, in Paradise Reforged, claims 1882 is the best know date in New Zealand history, p. 53. 
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disruption to trade over thousands of miles, Britain saw only a slight decrease and the US 
a slight increase.  Britain and the US continued to trade position as top market for 
Canada.  After the war, the US finally and definitively supplanted Britain as Canada’s 
main market.  New Zealand exports to Britain held steady although there was a gradual 
and long-term decline evident after 1950.  (Graphs 1a & 1b) 
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Graph 1b: EXPORTS FROM NEW ZEALAND TO BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
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The export stories of the two dominions were different in important respects, 
including the distribution of exports and the volatility of trade patterns.  Even so, their 
                                                 
19 B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993, 4th edition (London, 1998). 
20 B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania 1750-1993, 3rd edition 
(London and New York, 1998). 
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export patterns followed the same general direction: there was an absolute drop in trade 
with Britain of roughly 10% between 1920 and 1950.  (Graph 2)  This was a more 
significant drop for Anglo-Canadian trade, representing a relative fall of 38% (from 
24.1% to 15%).  These downward adjustments occurred even though the commodities 
being exported did not change greatly.  Over this thirty year period, the top five Canadian 
and New Zealand exports were constant although the ranking changed slightly.  (Graph 
3a)  For example, in Canada, newsprint was second in 1926; first in 1948; wheat was first 
in 1926; second in 1948.  In New Zealand, wool and butter held steady at one and two 
throughout the period, cheese and lamb switched places to three and four.  (Graph 3b)  
These findings suggest that economic development was not transforming what was 
produced for export, although some of these exports were subject to more refining. 
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Graph 3a: CANADA’S MAIN EXPORTS 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950 (% of total)21 
                                                 
21 Canada Yearbook 1948-9, 1952-3. 
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Graph 3b: NEW ZEALAND’S MAIN EXPORTS 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950 (% of 
total)22 
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 As for imports, the US was a far more important source of supply for Canada than 
Britain, a position it had enjoyed since the late 19th century.23   New Zealand imports 
were in a holding pattern with Britain the most important supplier by a great deal.  The 
US and Australia were other important sources of supply.  British imports in Canada 
increased briefly after the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference but reverted to 
1920s levels by the start of the Second World War.  American imports fell in the early 
                                                 
22 New Zealand Official Yearbook 1924, 1933, 1944, 1953. 
23 The United States first surpassed Britain as a supplier to Canada in 1876.  Britain regained top spot 
between 1880-1882, slipped again until it pulled even with the US in 1887, and thereafter lagged far 
behind. 
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part of the decade but were restored by its end.  As for New Zealand, imports from 
Britain and the US both dropped roughly 10% during the 1930s.  As was the case for 
exports, the 1940s were volatile.  During the war American products sold in Canada 
increased while British products fell.  The gap narrowed slightly in the early postwar 
years.  American goods flooded New Zealand during the war, in particular when 
American servicemen were based there.  The effect did not last.  After the war the United 
States resumed its prewar level of supply whereas Britain’s importance increased over its 
prewar position.  (Graphs 4a & 4b) 
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Graph 4b: IMPORTS TO NEW ZEALAND FROM BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
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British imports in Canada ended in 1950 approximately 30% lower than where 
they had started in 1920 but significantly improved their position in New Zealand.  
(Graph 5)  There were fluctuations and dips, responses to international circumstances and 
pressures as well as national economic growth and diversification.  Britain’s market share 
in Canada and New Zealand remained significant for both Canada and New Zealand in 
terms of value.  Although proportionally British trade with New Zealand was far more 
impressive, the total value of trade with Canada was larger.24 
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 The principal commodities imported were also surprisingly constant.  In Canada, 
coal was the top import in 1926, it ranked third in 1948; petroleum was the second most 
important import in 1926; first in 1948.  The main shifts were in the importance of farm 
machinery (14th in 1926, 4th in 1948) and cars (11th in 1926, 5th in 1948).  (Graph 6a)  
New Zealand saw some changes in its imports.  Cars were the top import in 1926; 5th in 
1948.  But the overall composition of leading imports was fairly constant.  (Graph 6b) 
 
Graph 6a: CANADA’S MAIN IMPORTS 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950 (% of total) 
                                                 
24 New Zealand’s population, one seventh the size of Canada’s, consumed about 60% of the amount of 
British products that Canadian consumers did in 1920 and almost 70% as much in 1950.   
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Graph 6b: NEW ZEALAND’S MAIN IMPORTS 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950 (% of total) 
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 The economic picture that emerges by 1950 is of economic growth but not that 
much development.  The persistence of natural resources and food as primary exports, as 
well as dependence on outside suppliers for machinery, fuel and other manufactured 
goods, meant that the Canadian and New Zealand economies, although industrializing, 
still specialized in agriculture and natural resource extraction.  While Canada could be 
considered an industrial state by 1950, New Zealand was a developing economy.   
This brief overview reinforces the views of Singleton and Robertson and others 
that an imperial economy was evident after the Second World War in terms of volume of 
trade as well as patterns of economic development which perpetuated commercial links 
between the dominions and the former mother country.  If the study was broadened to 
include Australia and South Africa the argument would be even more compelling.  
(Graphs 8a & b)  Where there was a deterioration of imperial trade, more noticeable for 
Canada than New Zealand, there was a gradual evolution away from imperial trade rather 
13 
than some identifiable watershed.  The persistence of an imperial trade network has 
implications for the nationalist conception of dominions’ history.  Were Canada and New 
Zealand still in a colonial relationship with Britain?  Were they somehow less 
autonomous and independent than the nationalist accounts assert? 
 
Graph 8a: EXPORTS FROM THE ‘OLD DOMINIONS’ TO BRITAIN, 1920-1950 (% 
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Graph 8b: IMPORTS FROM BRITAIN TO THE ‘OLD DOMINIONS’, 1920-1950 (% 
of total) 
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TRADE POLICY IN CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND 
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This analysis of trade policy focuses on two episodes: the Ottawa Imperial 
Economic Conference of 1932 and its aftermath and the international effort to set up the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade after the Second World War.  In both instances, 
Canadian and New Zealand officials were forced to come to terms with the possibilities 
and limitations of an imperial economy and an international economy in which the 
United States was central.  Canadian and New Zealand governments had to choose 
whether to trade in an imperial context, represented by Britain, or to focus on 
international trade, represented by the United States.  There was a sense that these 
choices were mutually exclusive and had implications for Canadian and New Zealand 
international relations more generally. 
 
 In 1930 Prime Minister R. B. Bennett of Canada campaigned on a promise to use 
tariffs to blast into foreign markets.  While the economic logic underpinning this policy 
was not clear, the political message was welcome: a government under Bennett would not 
sit idly by.  After the election, Bennett called for an imperial solution to the Depression, 
not surprising given Canadian exports were more immediately affected by the closing of 
the American market than New Zealand.  In addition, the Conservative party in Canada 
had a long tradition of nurturing ties to Britain.   
 During the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference of 1932, Canadian negotiators 
focused on discussions with Britain and had little interest in negotiating with any other 
delegation.  However, Canadian officials were not inclined to make concessions to 
British exports, also desperate for sale abroad.25  The British delegation, which had 
arrived badly prepared, was shocked and dismayed by the absence of common cause and 
mutual support.  British officials singled out Bennett and Stanley Bruce, the leader of the 
Australian delegation, for special censure for demanding concessions in a brutal way, ‘as 
if they were dictating terms to a beaten enemy, as indeed they were – and all were at once 
conceded.’26   
 New Zealand negotiators also approached the conference with eyes focused on 
Britain.  Like their Canadian colleagues, they expected to offer little in return for 
                                                 
25 Rooth, British Protectionism, p. 95. 
26 J. Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925-1968 (London, 1978), p. 106. 
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preferred treatment in the British market.  As the British trade commissioner in 
Wellington observed, ‘there is some idea here of endeavouring to get something for 
nothing out of Ottawa.’27   But the Ottawa Conference of 1932 was not much of an 
opportunity for Wellington to improve the terms of trade with Britain.  New Zealand 
tariffs on British commodities were already low and Britain purchased the vast majority 
of New Zealand exports duty free.  London and Wellington could only reaffirm a 
commitment to continue to exchange favourable conditions.28   
Public statements at the beginning and end of the Ottawa conference affirmed the 
integrity and strength of the Empire and Commonwealth.  On the opening day, J.G. 
Coates of New Zealand declared ‘It is instinctive in our people that, in adversity, we 
should seek not merely our own self-preservation but also the preservation and 
advancement of other members of the family of British nations.’29  Stanley Baldwin, 
leader of the British delegation, proclaimed at the end of the conference that the 
willingness to extend preferential tariffs to one another was significant because it 
revealed that the dominions were choosing ‘closer imperial unity’ over ‘purely national 
interest’.30  The extension of preferential tariffs reinforced the idea of a Commonwealth 
economic bloc.  The agreements defined preferential margins - the difference between the 
lower imperial rate and the higher foreign/general rate - which were then set out in 
contractual terms.  Preferential margins could not be altered without the consent of the 
beneficiary, which encroached on the autonomy of all participating governments.  But 
even though they worked within an imperial economic context, Canadian and New 
Zealand trade policies, not to mention those of Britain, Australia and South Africa, were 
nationalist in conception.  The imperial preference system bestowed its advantages on 
imperial and Commonwealth exports by raising tariffs on ‘foreign’ (meaning non-
Commonwealth) commodities, not by lowering tariffs on Commonwealth goods.31  And 
preferential tariff rates were kept sufficiently high to offer protection to new industries in 
                                                 
27 Forrest Capie, ‘Australian and New Zealand Competition in the British Market, 1920-1939’, Australian 
Economic History Review, xviii, I, (March 1978), 50. 
28 Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 246. 
29 N. Mansergh, ed., Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. I 
(London, 1953), p. 128. 
30 Mansergh, ed. Documents and Speeches 1931-1952, Vol. I, p. 122. 
31 Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 85; D. Macdougall and R. Hutt, 
‘Imperial Preference: a quantitative analysis’, The Economic Journal, 64 (June 1954), 250-1. 
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Canada and New Zealand.  Hardly surprising, commentators at the time, and historians 
reviewing the conference after the fact, agree that there was little in the proceedings or 
results to justify enthusiasm for imperial trade.32 
 The imperial economic option was not the answer to Canada’s trade woes.  When 
the United States introduced the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934, 
Canada was quick to line up to negotiate a new trade agreement.  Britain and Australia 
also joined the queue.  The Canadian-American negotiations led to agreements in 1935 
and 1938, in which imperial preference was used as bait to entice the US to make more 
far-reaching concessions.33  The Canadian approach to trade was pragmatic.  Sentiment 
had little impact in the way Canadian policymakers or trade negotiators understood the 
national interest.    
 One might have expected New Zealand to be interested in the opening of the 
American market through RTAA because the price of New Zealand’s agricultural exports 
had plummeted during the Depression and officials like Coates, minister of finance from 
1931-1935, recognized that the British market ‘was not bottomless’.34   Nonetheless, New 
Zealand expressed no interest in the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement with the 
US.  It did, however, introduce measures to offset its economic vulnerability.  A radical 
Labour government, first elected in 1935, introduced quantitative restrictions to minimize 
economic upheaval brought on by external forces and thereby ensure decent living 
conditions for all of its citizens.35  The government took these steps even though its key 
trading partners objected to their methods. 
 During the Second World War, the US emerged as a more important ally to New 
Zealand.  Wellington opened a legation in 1942 and sent the deputy prime minister and 
minister of finance, Walter Nash, to head it.  A Canadian legation had been established in 
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Washington in 1927.  Although New Zealand officials tended to view Anglo-American 
proposals for a reformed international economy - what would become the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - with suspicion, Canadian officials were enthusiastic.  
Ottawa identified multilateralism as the ideal framework for postwar trade, especially as 
officials predicted that Canada would have to increase postwar exports over the prewar 
level by 60% to ensure prosperity.  Canada turned into a champion of GATT, defending 
the principles upon which it was based as well as trying to broker agreements when 
disputes emerged between its principal sponsors, Britain and the United States, as they 
did over the future of imperial preferences at the inaugural meeting of GATT in Geneva 
in 1947.  The conference was on the brink of collapse because of Britain’s refusal to 
abolish, or significantly retrench, preferential tariffs and American insistence that its 
credibility was contingent on the abolition, or significant retrenchment, of preferential 
tariffs.36  The government of Canada, galvanized into the self-appointed role of helpful 
fixer, unilaterally gave up a couple of preferences and asserted its right to amend, and 
remove, preferences without consulting the beneficiary, thereby revoking the contractual 
core of the imperial preference system.  American officials played up this concession to 
convince President Truman that the US had largely achieved its goal of dismantling 
imperial preference.37  Canadian actions thereby facilitated Anglo-American agreement, 
but not primarily out of a devotion to helpful fixing.  The multilateral organization of 
world trade along liberal and non-discriminatory lines was in Canada’s best interest.  
Without both British and American backing the GATT would not come to life.   
 The importance Ottawa attached to the GATT suggests that it conceived of its 
economic future within an international context rather than an imperial one.  This priority 
was acknowledged implicitly in the lack of Canadian interest in Anglo-Canadian 
negotiations.  The British pressed Ottawa to open negotiations since it was keen to 
improve its market share in Canada.  But British overtures were largely rebuffed, in large 
measure because they had little to offer to Canadian exporters.  In addition, lowering 
preferential rates would require equivalent and uncompensated reductions in the general 
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rate of duty.  And preferences functioned as the effective level of protection which 
Ottawa was intent on retaining.38 
 Rejecting the possibility of deepening the Anglo-Canadian trade relationship did 
not mean that Canada was submitting to the logic of continentalism.  The American 
economy, roughly twelve times the size of the Canadian economy, ensured that the 
economic relationship would be lopsided.  In Canada, debates about continental 
economic organization, and the political consequences that might arise, had been hotly 
debated since the mid-19th century.  Different strands of the debate revealed attraction 
and repulsion for both Britain as well as the US.  Fear of continentalism resulted in an 
effort to retain a meaningful commercial relationship with Britain.  Even though the 
Anglo-Canadian trade link was weakening, it was remarkably resilient in light of the pull 
of continental economic forces, at work since the 19th century.  If one looks again at the 
pattern of Canadian exports (Graph 1a), the balance achieved between the UK and US as 
markets for Canadian goods, to the point that they regularly swapped top spot, 
represented the ideal to a government intent on not choosing one ally over the other.  
Canadian trade policy, indeed its whole foreign policy, can be described as a policy of 
counterbalance.  The postwar trade pattern, in which the importance of the British market 
slumped quite dramatically represents the futility of government efforts to maintain 
commercial equilibrium. 
 New Zealand was more skeptical about the benefits of GATT.  Even though 
studies confirmed that a more liberal international economy would most effectively 
promote New Zealand’s prosperity,39  New Zealand was nonetheless intent on 
consolidating its niche in the British market.  Despite economic forecasts of slow growth 
in consumer demand in Britain,40 New Zealand and Britain had concluded four-year bulk 
purchase agreements for mutton, cheese and wool in 1944.  These agreements were 
extended until 1954, effectively locking up New Zealand supply for a decade.  While it is 
tempting to characterize this approach as one in which there was a refusal to 
acknowledge changes in the workings of the international economy and the limitations on 
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the British market, such a description would be largely incorrect.  New Zealanders feared 
the return of a global economic depression after the war (a widely shared fear) and 
doubted that the US would be able to reduce its own tariff on mutton, lamb and other key 
exports.41  Hence Singleton and Robertson noted that the Commonwealth economic 
system was ‘a bulwark against global economic (in)stability.’42  In addition, despite its 
small size, New Zealand had an advantage that it could and did capitalize on: Britain 
needed its agricultural exports for hungry and tired British citizens who believed that a 
New Jerusalem was due to them.43  New Zealand’s leverage vis-a-vis Britain was 
sufficiently strong that it erased, temporarily, the disparities of size and power.  Indeed, 
Britain encouraged New Zealand to continue its agricultural production after the war to 
address Britain’s own food shortage which reinforced their trade dependence at the 
expense of engagement in the international economy.44     
 Apprehension about economic instability was qualified by determination to limit 
national vulnerability to the forces of international economics.  New Zealand 
representatives at the inaugural GATT meetings insisted upon the right to use quantitative 
restrictions, (which New Zealand officials referred to euphemistically as import 
selection), even though such a measure was anathema to the Americans, contrary to the 
thrust of economic liberalism, and looked on askance by the British.45  New Zealand 
defended restrictive devices on the grounds that they were used only to the extent made 
necessary ‘by the limitation of our resources’46 and that such measures had an 
expansionary effect on New Zealand’s economy.47  Although such restrictive measures 
contravened the liberalizing aims of the Geneva conference, the government of New 
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Zealand insisted that, ‘New Zealand’s case is entitled to as much consideration as that of 
any one of the great powers.’48 
 New Zealand’s trade dependence on Britain was in a different league from 
Canada.  Britain was absolutely indispensable to the prosperity of New Zealand 
pastoralists, but New Zealand was not essential to the British economy.  This 
fundamental imbalance in the New Zealand-British trade relationship must be borne in 
mind.  In addition, New Zealand’s economic position was rendered precarious by its 
reliance on wool, butter and meat exports.  Circumstances beyond its control, let alone 
that of Britain, could cripple the New Zealand economy.  New Zealand’s trade policies 
were therefore formulated with location, size and apprehension about involvement in the 
international economy in mind.  One should not therefore accept emotional 
pronouncements, like that of Holland, as evidence of a willingness to subordinate New 
Zealand’s economic interests to those of Britain.  Sentiment had a tactical utility to 
strengthen New Zealand’s leverage in negotiations with Britain.  New Zealand’s strategy 
succeeded in the late 1940s because the power balance with Britain was roughly balanced 
by Britain’s desperate need for food.  The policy worked well in the short term.  In 1953, 
New Zealand was the third richest country in the world.  But in the long run New 
Zealand’s trade policy was flawed; as Britain recovered economically and had less need 
of New Zealand meat and butter, Wellington had less pull.  The bilateral balance of 
power tilted in favour of Britain, leaving Wellington facing an uncertain international 
trade environment.49 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The terms of the GATT negotiations were greeted with much protest and dismay 
in Ottawa, Wellington and London, particularly concerning imperial preference and 
connections to the mother country.  Parliamentary debates on trade policy were 
passionate and conjured up powerful and visceral language of attachment which in turn 
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linked issues of trade to national identity and international alignments.  For example, 
Walter Nash reassured anxious politicians on the eve of the Geneva conference that 
‘There is not a chance of anything being done by this Government that will breach the 
relations of New Zealand with the Old Country.’50  In London an insightful British M.P. 
observed, sentimental pronouncements were misleading when it came to understanding 
the substance of trade policies.  ‘Words have certain connotations which people are apt to 
accept without thinking about them, and then we go on talking about Empire trade 
without analysing the position.’51 
Understanding the motivations and goals of Canadian and New Zealand trade 
policy cannot end with politicized language of association, such as was evident in King’s 
self-important diary entry and Holland’s impetuous outburst.  Canadian and New Zealand 
calculations concerning trade were unsentimental, as bureaucratic analyses revealed.  
Simon Reisman, who joined the Canadian Department of Finance after the war, explained 
that officials looked upon the revision of preferential tariffs as ‘a constructive exercise’.52  
Mitchell Sharp, also a member of the Department of Finance in the 1940s, acknowledged 
that there was a powerful emotional connection to Britain, but it ‘had nothing to do with 
preferences.’53  Government economists and bureaucrats calculated how best to ensure 
markets would remain open to their exports.  The consensus was that the British market 
would not grow sufficiently to support their anticipated growth and development.  
Realizing the limits of the British market did not lead to wholesale repudiation in favour 
of an American-centred international economy.  Canada and New Zealand both continued 
to value the British market.  For Canada, the British market offered balance and freedom 
to maneuver that went with such an equilibrium; for New Zealand it was the preferred 
choice for a small and vulnerable power.  One could say that their trade policies were 
incoherent, as some historians have described Canadian trade policy.54  There was an 
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underlying coherence: to sell exports, wherever possible and to make those sales as 
secure as possible in an uncertain world.  Politicized and emotional rhetoric can obscure 
this point.  And yet that rhetoric cannot be ignored.  It signaled a desire, at the level of 
governments, to maintain a British connection.  New Zealand’s trade patterns more 
closely corresponded to diplomatic aims because the government was largely responsible 
for the sale of agricultural exports whereas there was considerably less direct government 
intervention in Canada.55 
This reading of trade patterns and policies attempts to reconcile recent arguments 
about an imperial economy with prevailing nationalist political interpretations and 
advances a methodological suggestion.  Trade patterns between Britain, Canada and New 
Zealand remained surprisingly vital despite industrial development, economic 
diversification, and the strength of regional economic forces up to 1950.  The economic-
nationalist narrative therefore exaggerates the dominions’ divergence from an imperial 
economy.  However the persistence of an imperial economy does not refute the primacy 
of nationalism which is revealed when one examines trade policy in Ottawa and 
Wellington.  Evidence from the imperial economic conference of 1932 and the 
negotiations that led to the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
highlights the choices made by the dominion governments in which historic and 
sentimental attachment to Britain did not ultimately determine policies.  Throughout the 
thirty year period under study, the logic of economic nationalism dictated that New 
Zealand should consolidate its position in the British market since few others were 
accessible to its exports and that Canada should retain trade links to Britain to safeguard 
national sovereignty and identity which seemed equally threatened by too close 
association with either Britain or the United States.  In short, Canada and New Zealand 
chose to operate in an imperial economy because they benefited from doing so.   
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